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On the Saddle-Point Solution of a Class of 
Stochastic Differential Games 1 
T. BASAR 2 
Communicated by Y. C. Ho 
Abstract. This paper deals with the saddle-point solution of a class of 
stochastic differential games described by linear state dynamics and 
quadratic objective functionals. The information structure of the prob- 
lem is such that both players have access to a common noisy linear 
measurement of the state and they are permitted to utilize only this 
information in constructing their controls. The saddle-point solution of 
such differential game problems has been discussed earlier in Ref. 1, but 
the conclusions arrived there are incorrect, as is explicitly shown in this 
paper. We extensively discuss the role of information structure on the 
saddle-point solution of such stochastic games (specifically within the 
context of an illustrative discrete-time example) and then obtain the 
saddle-point solution of the problem originally formulated by employ- 
ing an indirect approach. 
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1. Introduction 
Stochastic differential games, saddle-point solutions, 
structures, conjugate-point conditions, linear-quadratic 
Consider  the zero-sum, two-person,  stochastic differential game in 
which the state dynamics are descr ibed by a l inear stochastic differential  
equat ion,  the object ive functional is quadrat ic,  and the players have access 
to the same l inear noisy measurements  of the state. Further ,  assume that the 
noise processes in the state and measurement  equat ions are appropr iate  
Wiener  processes, and the permiss ib le controls of the players are chosen as 
causal functions of the measurement  process. This stochastic differential 
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game has been considered earlier in Ref. 1, and it has been "proven" that he 
saddle-point solution satisfies the separation principle and requires the same 
existence conditions as the deterministic version of the problem (obtained 
by replacing the noisy measurement with a perfect state measurement). In 
this paper, we show that this conclusion is false, and that derivations of the 
saddle-point solution and the xistence conditions require a much more 
involved analysis than the one given in Ref. 1. 
In the next section, we provide a precise mathematical formulation of 
the problem and discuss inherent limitations of different direct methods that 
could be used in obtaining its saddle-point solution. In Section 3, we include 
a solution of the deterministic version of the problem, and elucidate the 
nature and the sources of the error committed in Ref. 1 with regard to the 
solution of the stochastic game. In order to have a better understandingof 
the role of information structures inzero-sum stochastic differential games, 
and of the pitfalls in the derivation of the saddle-point solution, we present 
in Section 4 a scalar, two-stage, discrete-time version of the original 
problem, in particular, we show that, while the deterministic version of this 
scalar dynamic game admits a pure-strategy saddle-point solution, its 
stochastic version admits a saddle point in only mixed strategies. 
The main results of the paper are given in Section 5, and are embedded 
in Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.1. Specifically, we obtain closed-form 
expressions for the saddle-point strategies of the players in the linear- 
quadratic stochastic differential game, and prove that the required condi- 
tions of existence do not coincide with, and are in fact more stringent than, 
the existence conditions of the deterministic version of the problem. The 
paper ends with a conclusions section where we discuss possible xtensions 
to similarly structured nonzero-sum differential games. 
2. Problem Statement 
The linear-quadratic, zero-sum, stochastic differential game under 
consideration can be defined in precise mathematical terms as follows: The 
evolution of the state (x) of the game is described by the linear Ito stochastic 
differential equation 
dxt = A (t)xt dt + Bp (t)u, dt + B ,  (t) vt dt + F(t )  dw ~, 
(1) 
to <-- t <-- t~, xto = Xo, 
and the common observation y of the players is described by 
dyt = C(t)xt dt + G(t) dw 2, (2) 
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where 
dim(x) = n, dim(u) = rp, dim(v) = re, 
dim(y) = m, dim(w 1) = n, dim(w 2) = m, 
and the matrices A, Bp, Be, C, F, G have appropriate dimensions and are 
continuous on [to, tf]. Furthermore, 
FF '> 0, GG'>O, 
on the interval [to, tr]. Xo is the value of the initial state which is assumed to be 
Gaussian distributed with mean zero and covariance Po. The functions ut 
and vt, t >- to, represent the controls of the pursuer and the evader, respec- 
tively, and are vector stochastic processes with continuous sample paths, as 
to be further explained in the sequel, xt, t-> to, is an n-dimensional vector 
1 t->to, and 2 stochastic process with continuous ample paths; and w t, we, 
t -> to, are statistically independent s andard Wiener processes. 
To delineate the information structure of this game problem, we let 
Cm = C,.[ to, tr] 
denote the space of continuous functions on [to, tt], with values in R m We 
further let Y, be the sigma-field in Cm generated by the cylinder sets {y ~ Cm, 
y, c B}, where B is a Borel set in R m and t0-< s -< t. Then, the information 
gained by each player during the course of the game is completely deter- 
mined by the information field Y,, t-> to. A permissible strategy for the 
pursuer will be a mapping yp (., • ) of [to, t r] x Cm into R p with the following 
properties: 
(i) yp (t, 7) is continuous in t for each ~ ~ Cm ; 
(ii) yp (t, rt) is uniformly Lipschitz in 7/; i.e., 
I),p (t, lq)- yp(t, so)l--< kH~ -~¢1I, te  [to, q), r/, ~:~ C,,, 
where ]]. [] is the standard sup norm in Cm ; 
(iii) u, = yp(t, r/) is adapted to the information field Y,. 
We denote the class of strategies described above for the pursuer by Fp. 
Analogously, a permissible strategy % (., • ) for the evader will be defined as 
a mapping of [to, tr] × Cm into R re with properties (i) and (ii) above, and with 
the restriction that v, = y~ (t, r/) be adapted to the information field Yr. Let us 
denote the collection of all such strategies for the evader by Fe. It is known 
that, corresponding to any pair of strategies {yp e Fp, Ye e Fe}, the stochastic 
differential equation (1) admits a unique solution that is a sample-path- 
continuous econd-order process (Refs. 2, 3). Consequently, the obser- 
vation process yt, t ~ to will also have continuous sample paths. For any pair 
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of strategies {3"p ~ Fp, y~ ~ F~}, the expected objective function for this zero- 
sum game is defined by 
Y(3"p, ")/e)~-E X~f(~fXtfq- (x'tO(t)xt+hu~ut-v~vt) d  , (3) 
o 
where 
ut = yo(t, y~), v, = ye(t, y~), 
denoting the stochastic process y~, s-> to, restricted to the time with y~ 
interval [to, t], Or >- 0, O(t) >- O, for all t ~ [to, tr], and h is a positive scalar. It 
should be noted that (3) defines the most general quadratic ost function 
with nonnegative weights on the components of the state and positive 
weights on the components of the controls of the players. Actually, A can 
also be absorbed in the state equation, without any loss of generality, but we 
prefer to keep it here as a free parameter which we will have occasion to 
utilize later. 
The pursuer attempts to minimize J, while the evader seeks to maximize 
the same quantity. Then, a pair of strategies {3'* ~ Fp, 3"* ~ F~} will be in 
saddle-point equilibrium if the pair of inequalities 
y(y~*, y,)--<-J(y~*, * < Ye ) - - J (Yp,  Ye*) (4) 
are satisfied for all yp ~ F~, ye ~ Fe. 
A direct approach to obtain the solution of this stochastic zero-sum 
differential game would be first to determine the security strategies of the 
players and then to investigate conditions under which they constitute a 
saddle-point equilibrium pair. Recall that a security strategy for a player 
(say, the pursuer) is defined as a 3"~, ~ Fp that satisfies 
sup J(3"~, Ye)= inf sup J(yp, Ye). (5) 
~e~F~ ~p~Fp ye ~I'~ 
But any attempt to obtain the solution of this equality readily fails, since the 
optimization problem 
sup /(yp, 3"~) 
yeEFe  
structurally depends on the choice of 3"p, and thus one has to solve a different 
problem for each permissible choice of 3"p ~ Fp. One way out of this difficulty 
would be to restrict 3"p to a linear class, say 
P t 
3',(t, y~)=/  N(t, r) dy,  (6) 
Jt o 
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where N( . ,  .) is a matrix function of appropriate dimensions (as has been 
done in Ref. 4 for the case when the players have different measurements), 
but this approach leads to a set of coupled infinite-dimensional equations 
which are quite intractable as far as the explicit derivations of the saddle- 
point solution and the saddle-point conditions are concerned. One can even 
assume a finite-dimensional representation for the integral (6) and then 
verify that the saddle-point strategy of the pursuer indeed lies within that 
subset of F v (as has been done in Ref. 5 for a similar problem with a 
somewhat different information structure), but this approach also leads to 
some unwieldy expressions and conditions which are not easy to manipulate. 
In this paper, we present an indirect way of obtaining the saddle-point 
solution of this problem, by relating it to a representation f the saddle-point 
solution of another zero-sum differential game, which is easily computable. 
3. Saddle-Point Solution under Deterministic Information Pattern 
Before obtaining the solution of the stochastic game problem as formu- 
lated above, let us recall the saddle-point solution of its deterministic version 
as far as the information structure is concerned. That is, the players now 
have access to the current value of the state at each instant of time and they 
recall past state information throughout the duration of the game. But the 
additive Wiener process term in the state equation is still retained in order to 
ensure unicity of equilibria (see Ref. 6, Section 4, for specific reasons). Then, 
the saddle-point solution is unique and is given by (Ref. 6) 
yp* (t, x~) = -(1/h)B'p(t)S(t)x,, (7-1) 
~/* (t, x'o) = B'e(t)S(t)xt, (7-2) 
where S(.) satisfies the Riccati equation 
+ SA + A 'S  - S (B~; /A  - BeB'e)S + O = 0, (8-1) 
s(tr) = 0~. (8-2) 
The condition of existence of the saddle-point solution is precisely the 
existence of a symmetric matrix solution to (8), which is well known to admit 
conjugate points if the time interval is taken sufficiently large. However, it is 
also known that, for a fixed time interval [to, tr], and for fixed game 
parameters (other than a), it is possible to find a ao > 0 so that the solution to 
(8), and hence the saddle-point solution to the game of this section, exist for 
all 0<a <ao. In particular, a ao that does the job independently of the 
length of the time interval is that value of a for which 
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where e is a sufficiently small positive parameter. However, this is only a 
sufficient condition, and it is always possible to find a larger A0 that depends 
on the length of the time interval. 
One question that readily comes into mind now is whether one can 
obtain the solution of the stochastic game problem of Section 2 by making 
use of the solution of this deterministic problem, by paralleling an analysis 
that leads to the separation result of stochastic optimum control. An 
argument in favor ofthis dictum would be: "Since both players have access 
to the same noisy observation which is linear in the state, there is no reason 
why the separation theorem should not be valid for the stochastic differential 
game of Section 2 also." This argument was actually the motivation behind 
derivation of the saddle-point solution given in Ref. 1 (p. 187, Theorem 7.2) 
for precisely the same problem formulated in Section 2. This asserted 
saddle-point solution follows readily from (7) to be 
T°(t, y~)) = - (1/h)B'p(t)S(t)£, ,  (9-1) 
to(t, , Yo) = B'e(t)S(t)£t, (9-2) 
where S again satisfies (8) and where £t, t -> to, is defined by 
d£t = A (t)2t dt + Bp (t) u, dt + Be (t)v, dt + K (t)[dyt - C (t)2, dt], 
and 
(10-1) 
t~ to, ~ = 0, (10-2) 
K (t) = P( t )C ' ( t ) [G (t)G'(t)] -1, (11-1) 
t 5 - AP  - PA '  + PC' [GG'] -~ CP - FF '  = O, (11- 2) 
e(t0) = e0. (11- 3) 
It is claimed in Ref. 1 that (9) indeed provides the unique solution to the 
stochastic differential game problem under consideration, and that it 
requires the same existence condition as that of the deterministic version 
treated above, both requiring nonexistence of a conjugate point for the 
Riccati equation (8) in the interval [to, tr]. Even though the latter statement 
is true within a more general framework, the former statement is incorrect, 
since the solution (9) does not lie in the product strategy space Fp × Fe. This is 
mainly due to the fact that 2t given by (10) is defined as the conditional mean 
of xt, given not only the past measurements {y~, s-< t}, but also the past 
control values {us, s - t} and {vs, s - t}. Hence, the proposed trategies (9-1) 
and (9-2) constitute a saddle-point pair, within a much larger class of 
strategies than Fp x Fe, and moreover, within that larger class, they are not 
unique. This nonuniqueness i  mainly due to the fact that, if the information 
set of a player includes both the observation and the value of control of the 
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other player, then a possibility of adopting different representations of the 
same control value emerges, which gives rise to a multiple of different 
saddle-point strategy pairs, each one requiring a different existence condi- 
tion. Perhaps, the best illustration of this phenomenon can be provided 
within the context of a scalar zero-sum difference game that involves two 
stages, which is done in the next section. In Section 5, we turn back to the 
game problem of Section 2 and discuss its unique solution and a necessary 
existence condition, i  the light of the discussion given above and the 
illustrative xample solved in Section 4. 
4. Illustrative Two-Stage Dynamic Zero-Sum Game 
As an illustration of the pitfalls in the derivation of the saddle-point 
solutions of stochastic dynamic games, let us consider the zero-sum, two- 
stage, stochastic game whose state dynamics are described by the difference 
equation 
X2"=XI- -H+WI,  (12-1) 
xl = Xo+2V + w 1, (12-2) 
and whose expected cost function is 
Y = E{(x2) 2 + Au 2 -  v2}, (13) 
where u is the scalar control of the pursuer, v is the scalar control of the 
1 evader, and A >0.  Xo, wl, Wo are statistically independent zero-mean 
Gaussian random variables with unit variance. 
Under the deterministic closed-loop information pattern which allows 
the evader to have access to the value of x0, i.e., 
v = ve(xo) ,  
and the pursuer to have access to both xo and xl, i.e., 
IX =- '}tp(Xl, Xo), 
this zero-sum dynamic game admits the unique saddle-point solution 
"lip (X1, XO) = [1/ (1 q-/~)]X1, 
3~e* (Xo) = [2t/(1 -- 3A)]Xo, 
with the condition of existence being 
O<)t < 1/3. 
(14-1) 
(14-2) 
(14-3) 
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That is, using the notation of section 3 under the right interpretation, 
Ao has the unique value Ao = 1/3, for this scalar problem. 
If the additive noise terms w~ and w01 in (12) were absent, however, the 
solution would not have been unique. Paralleling the analysis of Ref. 7, we 
obtain the result that any pair 
~p(X1, X0) = ~t(X1, X0), (15-1) 
~,e (xo) = [2~/ (1  - 3,~ )]Xo, (15-  2) 
with the side condition 
0([1 + h )/(1 - 3A )]x0, x0) ---- [1/(1 - 3h )]Xo, (15- 3) 
then constitutes a saddle-point solution under the condition 
411 - ¢7xl] 2 + 4h (47xl) 2 -1  < 0, (16) 
where 
~xl __a [V,lO(xl ' Xo)] = [(1 +A)/(1 -3A)]Xo. 
Replacing 47xl in (16) by 
~xl-[1/(1 +A )] + [1/(1 +A)] 
and simplification yields the equivalent condition 
3A/(1 + A) + 8 [¢7~, - [1/(1 + A)]]2(1 + ,~) < 0, (17) 
from which it follows that, in order to obtain the least stringent condition in 
A, ¢7x~ must be picked so as to make the second nonnegative term in (17) zero, 
which in fact yields the solution (14-1), thus corroborating the conclusion 
arrived at in Ref. 7. 
Now, let us instead endow the players with the noisy observations 
y0=xo+w0 2, (18-1) 
yx=x l+w~,  (18-2) 
where wo 2 and w~ are statistically independent Gaussian random variables 
with mean zero and variance unity. Furthermore, they are also assumed to 
be statistically independent of Xo, w~, w {. The evader has access only to y0, 
i.e., 
v = 3'e (Y0),  
whereas the pursuer has access to both Yo and yl, i.e., 
u = 3'p(yl, yo). 
Denote their respective strategy spaces by F, and Fp, respectively. 
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Proposition 4.1. The stochastic dynamic game of this section does not 
admit a saddle point in Fp x F~. 
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists a saddle point in 
Fp x Fe, and denote that pair by (y*, y*). Then, by definition of a saddle 
point, yp* must minimize Y(yp, y*) over Fo. This minimization problem 
yields the unique relation 
3'~ (yl, yo) = [1/(1 +,~)]E{Xl [y0, yl, v = V* (")} 
= [1/(1 + h)][(1/3)yl + (1/3)yo + (4/3)7* (yo)]. 
This implies that the structural dependence of y~ (yl, yo) on yl is linear and 
through the coefficient term [1/(1 + t)](1/3). This makes J(yp* (Yl, Y0), v) a 
quadratic function of v, and then the coefficient of the quadratic term in v 
can readily be determined to be 
3 + [20/(1 + h)9] > 0. 
This clearly indicates that J(y* (yl, Y0), v) is a convex function of v, and thus 
the maximum of J(y*, ye) over Fe does not exist, which contradicts the 
hypothesis that a saddle point exists. 
We thus observe that the stochastic dynamic game under consideration 
in this section does not admit a saddle point, even though its deterministic 
version does. This does not imply, however, that the upper value of the 
stochastic game defined by the kernel J(yp, Ye) is unbounded, since there 
exists a well-defined security strategy for the pursuer. Letting 
~(Y~, Y0) = yl, 
the reader can easily verify for himself that the upper value is bounded for 
A < 1/4, though this is not the security strategy of the pursuer. The security 
strategy of the pursuer is in fact in saddle-point equilibrium with an 
appropriate mixed strategy of the evader, which can be written as 
"~e(Yo) = ay0 + 8, 
where a is a scalar and ~¢ is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and 
an appropriate variance. This result can be verified by followingan analysis 
parallel to the one adopted in Section 3 of Ref. 8 in solving a particular 
stochastic game. We will not include details of this analysis here, since it is 
not directly related to the main objective of this paper. 
Since one can easily come up with examples of the preceding nature in 
the continuous-time s tting, the message to be transmitted here is that the 
stochastic, zero-sum differential game of Section 2 might not admit a 
saddle-point solution, even though its deterministic version considered in 
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Section 3 does; this is contradictory to what is claimed in Ref. 1. Before 
concluding this section, we should remark that, if the pursuer has also access 
to the value of the evader's control v, then one pair of saddle-point s rategies 
can readily be obtained from (14) to be 
~p* (yl, yo, v)= [1/(1 +h)];~, (19-1) 
y* (yo) = [2A/(1 - 3A)];o, (19- 2) 
where 
1 A ;1 a= E[xll y~, yo, v] = ;0 + v + ~[y l -  xo -  v], 
£o -~ (1/2)yo, 
with the existence condition being precisely (14-3). The reader can actually 
check this result by directly verifying that the pair (19) satisfies the relevant 
saddle-point inequalities. However, (19) is not the only saddle-point solu- 
tion within this enlarged class. By going through an analysis parallel to the 
one followed in Example 1 of Ref. 9, it can be shown that any strategy of the 
form 
yp(yl ,  Yo, v) = [1/(1 + A)]£1 + q[v - [2A/(1 - 3A)]£0] 
constitutes a saddle-point s rategy for the pursuer in equilibrium with (19-2) 
for a wide range of values for the parameter q, the existence conditions 
involved (on A) being different for each choice of q. 
In the next section, we reconsider the stochastic differential game of 
Section 2 and obtain exact expressions for its saddle-point solution, by 
taking into consideration the pitfalls encountered within the context of the 
illustrative example of this section. We furthermore obtain a necessary 
condition for existence of a solution, which is more stringent han that of 
Ref. 1. 
5. Main Results 
We now obtain the saddle-point solution of the linear-quadratic 
stochastic differential game of Section 2, whenever it exists, and also a 
necessary condition of existence. To this end, let us first consider the 
hypothetical game in which the players are also endowed with the past 
values of the control vectors, and denote the corresponding spaces of 
permissible strategies for the pursuer and the evader by Ut, and Ue, 
respectively. It should be noted that U v D Fp and Ue D F~. We now first have 
the following proposition. 
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Proposition 5.1. The strategies (9-1) and (9-2) constitute a saddle- 
point pair in the product space Up × b~. 
Proof. It is, first of all, apparent that 3, 0 given by (9-1) is an element of 
U v (but not of Fp), and 30 given by (9-2) is an element of U~ (but not of F~). 
Furthermore, xtgiven by (10) is the conditional mean of xt, given y~, v~, u~. 
Hence, the error term 
is independent of the controls of the players, and J can be written solely in 
the terms of £t, t -> to, with some remainder terms depending only on ~,, t -> to. 
This construction makes the problem no different from the deterministic 
game problem considered at the beginning of Section 3, with ~t replacing xt 
and the innovation term dyt - C£t dt replacing the Wiener process increment 
dw~. Then, the proposition follows from (7-1) and (7-2). The existence 
condition involved for the saddle point is clearly identical with the one of the 
deterministic problem. [] 
Let us now assume that the stochastic differential game admits a 
saddle-point solution also in the space Fp x Fe. Then, the following property 
can be proven. 
Lemma 5.1. Let the stochastic differential game admit a saddle-point 
solution pair {3,*, 3,*} on the product space F v × F~. Then, {3,*, 3,~*} also 
constitutes a saddle-point pair on the product space Up × U~. 
Proof. By hypothesis, the pair of inequalities (4) is satisfied for all 
Yv ~ Fv, Y~ ~ F~. Let us first consider the left-hand-side inequality which 
defines a stochastic optimum control problem, i.e., 
(i) Y(y*,  3t*)= max Y(y*, y~)<-supJ(y*,  3,e), 
F~ Ue 
where the last inequality follows, since F~ C U~. Now, for each 
y, = ye(t, yto, VtO, Uo)6t Ue, 
and with 
us = (s, y ; ) ,  
there exists a unique solution 
v, = q,(t, y~), t~to, 
of the implicit equation 
t ~ s Vt= 3,e(t, yto, Vo,3,v (s, yo)), t ~ to, 
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because of Lipschitz continuity and causality of the strategies. Furthermore, 
this solution ~e will be in Fe. Consequently, the inequality in (i) is in fact an 
equality. Analogously, it can be shown that 
min J(Yv, Y* ) = min J(Yv, Y*), 
r~ tr~ 
which completes the proof of the lemma. [] 
Lemma 5.2. Any two-saddle-point pairs in Up × Ue are interchange- 
able. 
Proof. Writing the kernel of the game as J(Yv, re) suppresses all the 
dynamic and stochastic nature of the problem and brings it to the normal 
form. The result hen follows as a well-known property of saddle points in 
zero-sum games (see, e,g., Ref. 10, p. 13). [] 
Theorem 5.1. Let the matrix Riccati equation (8) admit a unique 
symmetric solution on [to, t[]. Then, the saddle-point solution of the sto- 
chastic differential game of Section 2 is unique, whenever it exists, and is 
given by 
Y*v (t, yto) = - (1 /h  )B'v(t)S(t)zt, (20-1) 
3'* (t, y~) = B'.(t)S(t)z. (20-2) 
where 
dzt=[A- (1 /h)BvB'vS+B~B' ,S-KC]z ,  dt+Kdyt,  (21-1) 
t >- to, Zto= O, (21-2) 
and K(. ) is defined by (11). 
Proof. Under the hypothesis of the theorem, and by Proposition 5.1, 
the . o o . strategy pair {Yv, Y~ } given by (9) exists as a saddle-point solution on the 
product space Up x Ue. Let {~v e Fv, "~e ~ Fe} be any solution to the stochastic 
differential game under consideration. Then, by Lemma 5,1, they are also in 
saddle-point equilibrium in the product space Up x Ue; and, by Lemma 5.2, 
the pairs {'rv, y0}, {yo, ¢&} are also saddle-point pairs on U v x U~. Let us now 
consider the former pair, and in particular the right-hand side of the 
corresponding saddle-point inequality, which is 
0 ~ o Ye), for all ~ Up. 
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Writing out the xplicit expression for J(yp, 3,°), we have 
J(yp, y~)=E x~rOrx~+ (x 'Q( t )x t+Au' ,u t -b ;SBeB'~SbOdt  , 
t ~tO 
with xt, t >--to, and b~ t-> to, defined as the stochastic processes satisfying, 
respectively, 
dxt = Axt  dt+ Bput dt + B,B'eSbt dt + F dw ~, 
x~ = Xo, t >- to, 
and 
dbt = [A + BeB'eS - KC]bt  dt + Bvut dt + K dyt, 
bto = 0, t >- to, 
and with K( ' )  defined by (11). We thus observe that the problem of 
minimizing J(yp, 3, °) over Up is actually a standard LQG stochastic opti- 
mum control problem with state (x', b'~)' of dimension 2n. Since the 
coefficient of the quadratic term in this 2n-dimensional state in the cost 
function J(yp, yo) is sign-indefinite, the corresponding Riccati equation 
could admit a conjugate point depending on the length of the time interval 
[to, if]. But we know that this is not the case here, since, by hypothesis, 
(./p0, y0) constitutes a saddle-point pair. Hence, the kernel Y(yp, y0) is 
strictly convex in yp ; therefore, if we restrict ut only to be a function of the 
observation y~ (i.e., if we restrict yp to Fp), the solution is clearly unique. 
This implies that ~p is unique in Ft. In Up, however, the solution of this 
minimization problem is not unique, since it is possible to write down 
different "representations" of the same control value in Up. Nevertheless, 
the restriction of all these optimal representations to Fp is unique and is ~p. 
Now, to obtain an expression for 3~p, it is sufficient to note that, since 
{yo, y0 } constitutes a saddle-point pair, ~p is in fact the unique restriction of 
0 ,, yp to F t. Thus, ~/p can readily be obtained by substituting (9-1) and (9-2) into 
(t0), and solving for the unique ut that depends only on y~, which is (20-1). 
To prove validity of expression (20-2) as the unique saddle-point 
• 0 A • strategy of the evader, we start with the pmr {yp, y,} considered as a saddle 
point, and repeat the preceding argument with some obvious modifications. 
The result hen readily follows. 7-1 
In the light of the results obtained for the specific example of Section 4, 
existence ofa matrix solution to the Riccati equation (8) will not be sufficient 
for the pair (20) to be in saddle-point equilibrium. In the following corollary, 
we provide a necessary condition which is in fact more stringent than the 
sufficiency condition of the deterministic problem. 
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Corollary 5.1. Assuming that the matrix Riccati equation (8) admits a
well-defined solution [to, tr], a necessary condition for the stochastic 
differential game of Section 2 to admit a saddle point is the existence of a 
symmetric solution M(. ) to the 2n-dimensional matrix Riccati equation (22) 
on the interval [to, t~]: 
+MA +A'M +MBd3'eM + (~ = 0, (22-1) 
M(tr) = Of, (22- 2) 
where 
13'e &[B'e, 0], (23-1) 
0 =~ diag[Q, (1/A)SB~'z.g], (23- 2) 
(~r A diag[Q, 0], (23-3) 
___ l  .X_rA'__ . . . .  ] 
A-(1/A)BpB'pS+BeB'eS-KCJ" (23-4) I-KC I 
Proof. Under the hypothesis ofthe corollary, we know from Theorem 
5.1 that the saddle point of the stochastic differential game of Section 2 has 
to be given by (20), whenever it exists. Hence, to prove the corollary, it 
suffices to show that (20) does not constitute a saddle-point pair if the Riccati 
equation (22) does not admit a well-defined solution. To this end, we 
consider the right-hand side inequality (4), with 3'* and 3'* given by (20-1) 
and (20-2), respectively. This characterizes a tochastic control problem for 
the evader, which is maximization of the cost function J(3"*, 3"e). This cost 
function can explicitly be written as 
E l "  + t~ , "  
](3"~,vt) = {rnt, Ormtt Ito (mtO(t)mt-vtvt) dt}, (24) 
with mr, t >- to, satisfying the 2n-dimensional stochastic differential equation 
dmt = Amt dt + Bert dt + [0, K']' dyt + [F, 0]' dw ~, 
rnto = [x~, 0]', 
where A is defined by 
t > to, 
(25-1) 
(25-2) 
and all the other relevant terms are defined by (23-1) through (23-4). 
Furthermore, dyt can be written as 
dyt = [C, O]mt dt + G dwZt, t >-- to. 
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This implies that the stochastic optimum control problem faced by the 
evader is the maximization of (24), subject o the state equation 
dmt = Amt dt + t3~vt dt + ff; dw~, (26-1) 
rn~ = [x~, 0]', t -> to, (26-2) 
and under the observation equation 
dyt = [C, 0]mr dt + G dwt, (26-3) 
where 
1' w,=(w,,w~,') ' 
is an (n + m)-dimensional standard Wiener process, 
and 
o]. 
This is an LQG problem which admits a solution in F~, say 3;e (which is also 
unique), if the Riccati equation (22) admits a symmetric solution M(. ) on 
the interval [to, q], in which case 3~ is given by 
3;e (t, y~) = B'(t)M(t)rht, (27) 
with rh, satisfying the stochastic differential equation 
th Arh, dt + B~B eMrht dt d t "~- ~ ~? A 
+(ff[C,O]'+~')(~')- l (dyt-[C,O]rhtdt) ,  (28-1) 
rhto - 0, t >-- to, (28- 2) 
and/~(t) satisfying 
#=AP+I3A'+PP'-(O[c,  0] '+#0' ) (d&) - l ( [c ,  0]'P+ ~P'), (28-3) 
/~(to) = [ P° ~]. (28-4) 
See, e.g., Ref. 1, Chapter 7. It should be noted that the required inverse in 
these expressions exists, since 
GG' = [G, 0][G, 0]' = OG'> 0. 
Therefore, this implies that~ if the Riccati equation (22) has a conjugate 
point in the interval [to, t[], then there wilt exist a sequence ofcontrols for the 
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evader which will make the value of J(3,*, vt) sufficiently large without 
bound, which contradicts the right-hand side inequality (4). [] 
Remark 5.1. It is now almost immediate that the necessary condition 
of Corollary 5.1 is more stringent han the condition of existence of a 
solution to (8), since, if h is picked so that 
(1/A)BpB~ -BeB'e > eI, 
for a sufficiently small e > 0, then a solution to (8) always exists (regardless of
the length of the time interval), but the Riccati equation (22) will definitely 
have a conjugate point if the time interval is taken sufficiently tong. 
Remark 5.2. Even though the condition of Corollary 5.1 has been 
shown to be only necessary, it can be verified that it is also sufficient for the 
stochastic differential game of Section 2 to admit a saddle-point solution 
which is given by (20). A verification of this result involves ome extensive 
manipulations in showing that: 
(i) " -  * 3,e =3,e ,  
where the former is given by (27); and 
(ii) y* --- arg min J(3,p, 3'0* ), 
Fp 
under the conditions of Corollary 5.1. 
In fact, a recent independent study (Ref. 11) proves that the same 
condition is sufficient for (20) to provide a saddle-point equilibrium. In other 
words, the author of Ref. 11 starts with the strategies (20-1)-(20-2), and 
establishes their saddle-point property by solving two stochastic ontrol 
problems and under the condition of Corollary 5.1. Such a "verification- 
oriented approach", owever, is not constructive, and besides it does not 
lead to a complete solution of the problem; that is, the question of whether 
other pure-strategy saddle-point solutions exist whenever (20) ceases to be 
an equilibrium solution remains unanswered. The indirect derivation of this 
paper, however, answers this question completely; that is, the strategy pair 
(20) provides the only saddle-point equilibrium in pure strategies. 
6. Conclusions 
For a class of zero-sum stochastic differential games, we used an 
indirect approach to obtain the saddle-point solution in closed form, with 
the corresponding strategies realized as the output of an n-dimensional 
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system, where n is the dimension of the state. The existence conditions 
involved, however, are more stringent han those of the deterministic 
version of the problem; and, if they are not satisfied, then this implies that 
the stochastic differential game does not admit a saddle-point equilibrium in 
pure strategies. Nevertheless, the discrete-time example solved in Section 4 
hints that a saddle-point value might still exist, but this time within the class 
of mixed strategies (for the evader). Derivation of this mixed-strategy 
saddle-point solution seems, at this point, quite challenging, but Refs. 8 and 
12 could provide the reader with considerable insight into this difficult 
problem. 
Yet another class of problems of interest are the stochastic, nonzero- 
sum differential games tructured in the same way as the differential game of 
Section 2. But the method of approach used in this paper cannot be utilized 
to obtain the Nash equilibrium solutions of such differential games, since 
Nash solution pairs do not possess the interchangeability property (i.e., 
Lemma 5.2 is not valid in that case). A valid approach then would be an 
extension of the one used in Ref. 4, but that would require an a priori 
assumption (such as linearity) on the structure of the Nash strategies, and 
even then it is not conceivable that the Nash equilibrium strategies will be 
finite dimensional. For the discrete-time version of the same problem, 
however, a special version of the method of Ref. 13 can be utilized to 
determine the Nash equilibrium solutions (though not in recursive form). In 
that case, the Nash equilibrium strategies will be unique and linear, 
whenever they exist. 
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